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THE USE OF SOCIAL POLICY IN
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
Richard A. Daynardt
The nature and extent of the use of social policy in judicial deci-
sion-making is interesting from several perspectives. One is that of the
practicing lawyer, eager to know the grounds on which his cases will
be decided so that he can argue them more effectively, and anxious lest
sporadic judicial resort to amorphous social policies make the counsel-
ing of his clients more hazardous. A second perspective is that of the
judge, wishing to decide cases "according to law," but uncertain
whether the spirit of "sociological jurisprudence" embodied in such
cases as Brown v. Board of Education1 means that vaguely (or at least
not authoritatively) defined social policies are part of the law that he
must attempt to apply. Still another perspective is that of the social
critic concerned with the responsiveness of the judiciary to demands
for change not yet embodied in legislation.
In an effort to determine how much, and how, social policy is
used in judicial decision-making, I have examined a sample of con-
temporary American judicial decisions consisting of 300 recent cases
decided by three appellate courts. Classifying the cases by court, sub-
ject matter, the political sympathies of the author of the court's opin-
ion, the political tendency of the result, and whether the decision
engendered dissent among the panel deciding the case, I have measured
the relationship of these factors to the decision-making method used.
Where that relationship appears significant, I have reported and ana-
lyzed whether the social policy in question was supported by some
authority, and have tried to assess qualitatively the significance that
the reference to social policy appears to have had to the result reached.
I chose for study courts intermediate in the hierarchy between
trial courts and the United States Supreme Court, in the hope that
their decision-making techniques would represent a middle range be-
tween the fact-oriented and rule-bound approach typical at the trial
court level and the more general and innovative approach presumably
characteristic of the Supreme Court. By seeking to discover a middle
range within the total spectrum of techniques used by the American
judiciary, I hoped not only to cast light on the methods used by inter-
f Assistant Professor of Law, Northeastern University. A.B. 1964, M.A. 1970, Colum-
bia University; J.D. 1967, Harvard University.
1 847 U.S. 483 (1954).
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mediate level courts but also to develop a criterion for judging dis-
tinctiveness of the methods used by courts at the extremes of the
hierarchy.
In order to approximate a cross section of intermediate level
courts, I chose three well-known courts with differing caseload com-
positions: the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and
the District of Columbia Circuits,2 and the New York Court of Appeals.
For each of these courts I selected at random3 100 from among the
most recent decisions for which complete reports were available 4
I
CLASSIFICATION OF DECISION-MAKING METHODS AND RESULTS
I distinguished six principal methods of decision-making in the
cases studied, and classified them accordingly.
The first one, which I shall call the "particularistic,." reaches a
decision by reevaluating the trial court's determination of the facts or
its exercise of discretion in deciding what remedy is appropriate on
the facts. This method involves no serious questioning of the principles
of law that the trial court purported to apply, nor does it involve any
but the most brief consideration of the effects of the decision on future
cases or out-of-court behavior. It merely entails the proper application
of settled law to the facts (whatever the proper scope of the court's
2 The caseload of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit is a hybrid between that of a typical court of appeals (primarily federal questions,
federal crimes, and appeals from federal administrative agencies) and that of a typical
state supreme court, in that 50% of its business involves non-federal civil actions and ordi-
nary felonies originally tried in District of Columbia courts. The percentage breakdown
of the caseload is computed from Tables B-1, B-3, and B-7 of the ANNUAL REPORT OF TIM
DIRECrOR OF THE ADMINBTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNrrED STATES COURTS 176-89 (1968), which
is based on appeals commenced and decided in the federal courts of appeals in fiscal year
1968.
3 The only exceptions are (1) I was careful not to select a disproportionate number
of cases decided during any one month to avoid possible bunching of certain types of
cases during particular seasons (e.g., criminal cases before the Second Circuit in the late
spring); (2) in the case of the two federal courts I excluded opinions that merely stated
the judgment (generally those dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as opposed to
affirming the court below); and (3) in the case of the New York Court of Appeals I omit-
ted its "memoranda," which give a very sketchy statement of facts, proceedings below, and
arguments before the Court of Appeals, followed only by a statement of the result and
occasionally the citation of a case or two to justify it.
4 For the Second Circuit I drew from the decisions for February 1968 through Janu-
ary 1969; for the District of Columbia Circuit I drew from the cases decided between May
1967 and May 1968; and for the New York Court of Appeals I drew from the cases decided
November 1967 through July 1968.
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reviewing powers on such "questions of fact"), or else the question
whether the trial court "abused its discretion" on a matter committed
to the trial court in the first instance.
The second method, the "statutory" one, is most concerned with
what is proper interpretation of a particular statute, constitutional pro-
vision, treaty, administrative regulation, or rule of court. The court
treats this question as determinative and as decidable either on the
basis of the "plain meaning" of the words of the statute (or "quasi-
statutory" authority), combined with the accepted maxims for inter-
preting ambiguous language with the aid of other provisions of the
enactment, or on the basis of these plus the "legislative history" of the
provision.5
The third, or "precedential," method involves working out the
implications of previous authoritative decisions that may arguably be
controlling in the case at hand under the doctrine of stare decisis. In-
cluded in this category are opinions distinguishing the instant case
from the existing precedents as well as opinions stating either that the
court is bound to follow the asserted precedents or that it can see no
strong reason not to follow them, and hence will.
The fourth method, which Llewellyn calls the "Grand Style," is
similar to the statutory and precedential methods to the extent that
it plays down its innovative nature by stressing continuity with the
past, but differs sharply from them in admitting that the authorities
(chiefly statutes and cases in related areas) that it cites as the roots of
the present decision are merely persuasive and indicative of the "spirit"
or trend of the law. A celebrated example of this method is Judge
Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,7 where the
precedents were analyzed to show that the reasoning implicit within
them, though not necessarily their language, permitted and suggested
the result reached, lower court cases were cited as helping to show the
trend of judicial thought, and analogies to different but related areas
of the law were drawn. The court claimed to be faithful not only to the
canons of judicial craftsmanship but to the essence of the prior sub-
stantive law as well: "The principle that the danger must be imminent
does not change, but the things subject to the principle do change.
S This method does not extend, however, to cases where the court, though deciding a
statutory cause of action or defense, reaches its decision by working out the implications
of a previous decision authoritatively interpreting the statute, rather than by going di-
rectly to the statute itself or the purposes behind it; such cases are classified under the
"precedential" method.
6 K. I.EWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TADrON: DEcmiNG APPeA.s 35-45 (1960).
7 217 N.Y. 382. 111 N-.. 1050 (1916).
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They are whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require
them to be."" As Llewellyn describes the Grand Style:
It is a way of on-going renovation of doctrine, but touch with the
past is too dose, the mood is too craft-conscious, the need for the
dean line is too great, for the renovation to smell of revolution or,
indeed, of campaigning reform.9
This method is similar to the "social policy derived" method, discussed
below, in that it frequently supports its conclusion-that the "prin-
ciple" of the authorities cited points in the direction taken-with a
careful analysis of the consequences for future cases and out-of-court
behavior, as well as for the litigants at bar, of a decision either way.
Thus, Chief Justice Warren argued in Brown that separating Negro
children attending public schools "from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of in-
feriority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."' 0 The Grand
Style differs from the social policy methods, however, in that the court
does not explicitly look for its value premises beyond cases, statutes
(and their histories), the norm of rationality, and the (presumably
permanent) meaning of justice-that is, beyond the corpus of pre-
existing substantive law and the accepted techniques of explicating,
harmonizing, and applying it. Although a decision in the Grand Style
occasionally speaks of "policy," it uses the term only to refer to the
consequences of authoritatively binding decisions reached at an earlier
time by political and legal processes."
Only the fifth and sixth methods-the two social policy methods-
involve the explicit insertion of new principles into the corpus of pre-
existing substantive law. The fifth, or "social policy asserted," method
begins reasoning with a statement of the relevant social policy, pro-
ceeding from there to draw the implications for the case at hand. The
sixth method, "social policy derived," justifies its use of a particular
social policy by locating that policy in government spending programs,
statements of government officials, comments of social critics, and other
facts and documents that arguably indicate the content of the existing
8 Id. at 391, 111 N.E. at 1053.
9 K. LLxwELLYN, supra note 6, at 36.
10 347 U.S. at 494.
11 The provisions of the statutes and ordinances of this State requiring competi-
tive bidding in the letting of public contracts evince a strong public policy of
fostering honest competition in order to obtain the best work or supplies at the
lowest possible price.
Jered Contracting Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority, 22 N.Y.2d 187, 192-93, 239
N.E.2d 197, 200, 292 N.Y.S.2d 98, 102 (1968).
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or developing local or national consensus as to the meaning of justice
and the direction of needed social change. Thus, although the Brown
case is in part an example of the social policy derived method, this is
not because of its citation to social science material in its famous foot-
note 11,12 which was used merely to help demonstrate the fact that
"segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race,
even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be
equal, deprive[s] the children of the minority group of equal education
opportunities .... ,'13 Rather, social policy considerations of "the im-
portance of education to our democratic society"' ' were introduced to
justify establishing the norm of "equal education opportunity" as a
specification of the admittedly ambiguous constitutional mandate that
citizens shall not be denied "the equal protection of the laws."'15
As to the political tendency of the result, I classified a case as
"liberal" if the court could with some substantial justification have
come out the other way, and if the decision broadened the rights of
criminal defendants, gave a relatively expansive interpretation to pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights, preferred the interests of employees,
whether individually or collectively, to those of employers, helped
plaintiffs in personal injury actions, favored consumers over business,
or, in general, the relatively helpless over the relatively powerful. Con-
versely, I classified a case as "conservative" if it leaned in the opposite
direction along any of these dimensions, again provided that a decision
the other way could have been reached with some substantial justifica-
tion.
II
COMPARISON OF DECISION-MAKING STYLES
The breakdown in Table 1 for the three courts combined shows
that somewhat more than half of the cases were decided on the basis
of authority, statutory (including quasi-statutory) or precedential. This
does not mean that in many of these cases a plausible argument from
12 347 U.S. at 494-95 n.11.
13 Id. at 493. See Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 150 (1955).
14 347 U.S. at 493.
15 Where an opinion made substantial use of two or more of these methods, I classi-
fied the case under whichever of the methods was used by the court in resolving what it
considered to be the most critical non-factual issue in the case, and where two or more
methods were used in resolving that issue, I chose the one that first appears in the follow-





USE O1 DIFFERENT METHODS BY COURTS
Social Social
Particu- Prece- Grand Policy Policy
Court laristic Statutory dential Style Asserted Derived Total
District of
Columbia
Circuit 29% 25% 21% 20% 2% 3% 1OO%(100)
Second
Circuit 26 28 34 17 0 0 100 (100)
New York
Court
of Appeals 16 19 42 17 1 5 100 (100)
Combined 24 22 32 18 1 3 100 (300)
(71) (67) (97) (54) (3) (8)
authority could not have been developed for the opposite result, but
merely that the court claimed to be reasoning from premises authorita-
tively established by sources cited in the opinion. Another quarter of
the cases were decided on a highly particularistic basis. Most of the
remainder were decisions in the Grand Style. Only four percent of the
cases were decided by reference to social policy, asserted or derived.
The statistical breakdown by courts suggests significant differences
among them in characteristic decision-making techniques. The much
lower frequency of the particularistic method in the New York court
than in the two federal courts may be explained on two grounds. First,
the scope of review of factual questions allowed the court is greatly
limited by statute: full review of such questions is authorized only at
the intermediate appellate level. 16 Second, the New York court may
control its docket by refusing permission for a party to appeal where
appeal is not of right. This enables the court to select for full consider-
ation those cases that promise to raise questions of law whose resolu-
tion will provide guidance to the lower courts in future cases and to
other officials and private citizens in future out-of-court conduct; if
after full consideration the case seems quite obvious on either the facts
or the law, the court can deal with it in a memorandum. The federal
courts, on the other hand, must hear appeals from all "final orders" in
the district courts below.
17
The New York court is, again, significantly below the federal
courts in its use of the statutory method. This can to some extent be
16 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 5501(b)-(c) (McKinney 1963).
17 The difference may also be to some extent a result of my method of choosing cases,
wherein the memorandum opinions of the New York court were excluded but the short
per curiam opinions of the federal courts were not. But this would not account for the en-
tire difference, since cases dealt with by memoranda are generally analogous to the cases
that the federal courts would have affirmed from the bench, a procedure that results in no
opinion at all and hence prevented such cases from coming within my study.
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accounted for by the New York court's handling of very few labor cases
(only two in this sample, as opposed to an average of 13.5 for the
federal courts) or securities cases (none here, as opposed to an average
of 4.5 for the other courts); since each of these areas is pervaded by
comprehensive statutory schema, an unusually high percentage of these
cases (34% and 33%0 respectively) are decided by the statutory method.
At first glance the higher incidence of the precedential method in
the New York Court of Appeals than in either of the federal courts
seems explainable by the New York court's active engagement in the
exposition and development of the common law, and hence its readi-
ness to permit appeals primarily involving questions of the applica-
bility of common law precedents. The federal courts, on the other
hand, decide questions of common law only in diversity cases, which
constitute a small fraction of federal appeals, and in the much rarer
cases of "federal common law." But, although the New York court is
more concerned with traditional common law areas than the two
federal courts,18 it actually applied the precedential method less fre-
quently, and the statutory method more frequently, in these areas than
in others. Moreover, further statistical analysis shows that the District
of Columbia Circuit's extraordinarily infrequent use of the preceden-
tial method cannot be accounted for by any hypothesis of differential
caseload composition.
TABLE 2
UsE or DIFFERENT METhODS BY POLITICAL TENDENCY OF RzSULTS
Social Social
Political Particu- Prece- Grand Policy Policy
Tendency laristic Statutory dential Style Asserted Derived Total5
Neutral 28% (58) 24% (50) 31% (66) 16% (33) 0% (1) 1% (2) 100% (210)
Conservative 6 (1) 12 (2) 59 (10) 18 (8) 0 (0) 6 (1) 101 ( 17)
Liberal 16 (12) 21 (15) 29 (21) 25 (18) 3 (2) 7 (5) 101 ( 73)
Net Liberalness-  .15(71) .19(67) .11(97) .28(54) .67(3) .50(8) .19(300)
Another attractive hypothesis to explain the low District of Colum-
bia Circuit and high New York court utilization of the precedential
method is suggested by Table 2. Since the precedential method has a
18 In the sample taken, 30 of the New York cases were in the traditional common law
areas--contracts, torts, property, estates and trusts, and family law-whereas only nine of
the Second Circuit cases were in these areas; the District of Columbia Circuit, a hybrid be-
tween a common law court and a standard federal court, appropriately comes just in be-
tween, with 19 of its cases sampled falling in these areas.
19 Differences from 100% are due to rounding.
20 Computed by dividing the difference between the number of liberal-tending and
the number of conservative-tending cases decided using the method, by the total number of




PoLcAL TENDENcY OF RESULTS BY COURTS
Net
Court Neutral Conservative Liberal Liberalness
District of
Columbia Circuit 55% (55) 11% (11) 34% (84) M28 (100)
Second Circuit 78 (78) 1 ( 1) 21 (21) .20(100)
New York Court
of Appeals 77 ( 77) 5 (5) 18 (18) .13(100)
Average 70 (210) 6 (17) 24 (73) .19(300)
net liberalness of .11, or fifty-eight percent of that sample as a whole
(.19), perhaps the different use of the method by the three courts is a
reflection of differences in the liberalness of their members. This hy-
pothesis seems plausible, since a liberal judge eager to change the law
in favor of the relatively powerless would not want to follow precedents,
which generally support the existing balance of power, any more than
necessary whereas a more conservative judge might well content him-
self with the legitimacy provided by the precedential method. Indeed,
Table 3 seems to confirm this hypothesis, since the ranking of the three
courts on the basis of the percentage of their decisions that were in a
liberal direction is the inverse of their ranking on the basis of their use
of the precedential method (Table 1). But this hypothesis is not borne
out, either. Of the thirty-four liberal District of Columbia Circuit
decisions, seven (or 21%) used the precedential method, whereas only
fourteen (again 21%) of the sixty-six non-liberal opinions used that
method.
Yet the low liberalness of the technique might conceivably account
for its popularity among the judges of the relatively conservative New
York Court of Appeals. To test that hypothesis I ranked the judges in
order of net liberalness, based both on the opinions they wrote for
the court and on their dissents (Table 4). In the order of decreasing net
liberalness (with their percentage use of the precedential method in
parentheses) they were Fuld (42%), Bergan (388%), Van Voorhis
(67%), Burke (33%), Keating (48%), Breitel (40%), Scileppi (50%),
and Jasen (28%), where forty-two percent (Table 1) was the average
use of the method for the court as a whole. Contrary to the hypothesis,
the judges of the New York court do not make increasing use of the
precedential method with decreasing net liberalness. Similar results
were reached for the Second Circuit and, importantly, for the highly
polarized District of Columbia Circuit, as can be seen in Table 4.
Hence, although Table 2 demonstrates that in terms of the results it
[Vol. 56:919
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TABLE 4
LIBERALISM AND USE os DIFFErNT METHODS BY JUDGES
Net Social Social
(Court) Liberal- Particu- Prece- Grand Policy Policy
Judge
-




Bazelon .66( 6) 50% 0% 25% 25% 0% 0% 100%( 4)
Wright .66( 9) 0 50 17 17 0 17 101 ( 6)
McGowan .50( 8) 13 63 13 13 0 0 102 (8)
Leventhal .48(13) 25 25 17 17 8 8 100 (12)
Burger -. 33(18) 11 22 0 67 0 0 100 (9)
Danaher - .40(10) 40 10 50 0 0 0 100 (10)
Tamm -. 45(11) 14 28 14 14 14 14 98 (7)
(Second Circuit)
Smith .42( 7) 28% 43% 14% 14% 0% 0% 99%( 7)
Feinberg .40(10) 10 20 40 30 0 0 100 (10)
Kaufman .33(9) 0 22 44 33 0 0 99 (9)
Anderson .11(9) 25 25 25 25 0 0 100 (8)
Waterman .08(12) 17 42 33 8 0 0 100 (12)
Friendly .00(11) 10 10 20 60 0 0 100 (10)
Hays -. 20(10) 13 38 50 0 0 0 101 (8)
Lumbard -. 22(9) 33 17 50 0 0 0 100 (6)
Moore -. 33(6) 25 25 50 0 0 0 100 (4)
(New York Court
of Appeals)
Fuld .40(20) 0% 16% 42% 26% 0% 16% 100%(19)
Bergan .18(11) 50 13 38 0 0 0 101 (8)
Van Voorhis .14(7) 17 17 67 0 0 0 101 (6)
Burke .07(12) 33 33 33 0 0 0 99 ( 9)
Keating .00(27) 12 16 48 16 0 8 100 (25)
Breltel -. 12(17) 13 13 40 33 0 0 99 (15)
Sdleppi - .17(12) 20 20 50 10 0 0 100 (10)
Jasen -. 22(9) 14 43 28 14 0 0 99 (7)
yields, the precedential method is quite conservative, it appears to be
neither the bate noire of liberal judges nor the standard technique of
conservative ones.24
21 The judges of each court are listed in order of decreasing net liberalness, except for
Judge Robinson of the District of Columbia Circuit who is not included in the list since
only one of his opinions was sampled.
22 A judge's "net liberalness" was computed by taking the sum of the liberal cases for
which he wrote the opinion for the court plus the conservative cases in which he wrote a
dissent, subtracting from that the sum of conservative cases in which he wrote the opinion
for the court plus the liberal cases in which he wrote a dissent, and dividing this differ-
ence by the sum (given in parentheses) of the total number of cases in which he wrote the
opinion for the court plus the number of liberal and conservative cases in which he wrote
a dissent. Concurring opinions were not included in the formula; the tendency of concur-
rences to focus only on areas of disagreement with the majority precluded accurate cate-
gorization.
Since net liberalness is derived solely from the written opinions of each judge, and
votes unsupported by opinion are excluded, this factor should not be taken as necessarily
indicative of a judge's actual political tendency.
23 Differences from 100% are due to rounding. The total number of cases in which a
judge wrote the opinion of the court is given in parentheses.
24 The District of Columbia Circuit's infrequent use of the precedential method may
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Since the incidence of the precedential method differs sharply be-
tween the New York court and the two federal courts, but is a function
of neither the type of case involved nor the liberalness of the author
of the court's opinion, we appear to be left with the hypothesis that
the difference in court is itself the cause of the difference in the char-
acteristic techniques used by its members. That is, it may reasonably
be inferred that the three courts have developed distinctive styles of
decision-making within the broader range of styles considered per-
missible in American jurisprudence.
25
III
THE "SocIAL POLICY" CASES
A. Social Policy Asserted
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC26 presented the first court
challenge to the constitutionality of the FCC's "fairness doctrine." The
action challenged a radio station's refusal to comply with the Com-
mission's requirement that one personally attacked in a program
broadcast by that station be given free air time to respond to the charges
made against him.2 After discussing at great length the history of the
fairness doctrine in the Commission and in Congress, and concluding
that the doctrine had been promulgated and applied by the Commis-
sion under authority properly delegated to it by Congress, Judge Tamm
reviewed cases establishing the principle that "regulatory action by the
Commission ...does not per se violate the first amendment."28 He
result from the sharp polarization of that court (Table 4). This polarization has engendered
a high rate of dissent, making it perilous for a judge to rely on the precedential method to
justify his decision since the dissent is likely to argue that other authorities or social policy
make precedent an unreasonably narrow basis for decision. This hypothesis is supported to
the extent that the dissent rate in the cases examined (25%) is twice that of the Second
Circuit (12%); moreover, the Second Circuit uses the precedential method almost twice as
frequently as the District of Columbia Circuit. But the New York court, which has a 44%
dissent rate, has the highest (rather than lowest) rate of use of the precedential method.
25 The approximately equal utilization of the Grand Style by the three courts, and its
use in one-sixth to one-fifth of the cases, indicate that after a long period of almost total
eclipse by the "Formal Style" in the last half of the nineteenth century and the beginning
of the twentieth, this method has become firmly established in American jurisprudence as
a very important decision-making technique. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 6. The possible
effects of this, and of other methods, on the responsiveness of courts in making legal
changes that correspond to widely felt needs for social change will be considered in the
following section.
26 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967), aff'd, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
27 FCC, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Issues of Public
Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415, 10420-21 (1964).
28 381 F.2d at 923.
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stated for the court that there was no first amendment violation in this
application of the Commission's fairness doctrine.
In keeping with the public interest, I agree with the Commission
that:
"It would be inconsistent.., to assert that, while it is the pur-
pose of the act to maintain the control of the United States
over radio channels, but free from any regulation or condition
which interferes with the right of free speech, nevertheless per-
sons who are granted limited rights to be licensees of radio sta-
tions, upon a finding under... [the] act that the public interest,
convenience, or necessity would be served thereby, may them-
selves make radio unavailable as a medium of free speech."29
Judge Tamm was apparently asserting that "the public interest" which
is served by the requirement of free time for a reply to a personal attack
is more important than the traditional free speech right to decide
which expressions one will or will not propagate, a right Judge Tamm
assumed was available to broadcasters.8 0 Respectable arguments against
this assertion, which the Supreme Court took quite seriously on re-
view,31 maintained that the person attacked had access to other media
in which to respond, and that the rule tends to discourage stations
from broadcasting important controversial material by increasing the
cost of doing so. Although Judge Tamm could have made strong
arguments for the public interest in discouraging irresponsible per-
sonal attacks and in permitting persons publicly attacked the broadest
possible audience for their attempt to defend their reputations, what
is significant in terms of styles of judicial reasoning is that he did not
do so, but contented himself with an assertion of what the public
interest was, supported only by a passage begging the relevant questions.
In Pea v. United States,32 the full District of Columbia Circuit
held that "a judicial determination that a confession is admissible
cannot be made unless the judge is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that the confession was voluntary," 8 thereby overruling Clifton v.
United States,34 which held in part that the trial judge need merely be
29 Id. at 924, quoting Report of the Commission in the Matter of Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1248 (1949) (emphasis in original).
30 The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision, cast considerable doubt on this
assumption. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390-92 (1969).
81 See id. at 392-95. It is apparent that Judge Tamm was aware of these arguments
since they were discussed in the letter of Red Lion Broadcasting Company to the Commis-
sion and in the Commission's reply, both of which were set out in his opinion. 381 F.2d
at 913-17.
S2 397 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
3 Id. at 637 (footnote omitted).
84 371 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 US. 995 (1967).
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"satisfied" that the confession is voluntary. Judge Leventhal referred
to his concurring opinion in Clifton and to two decisions from other
courts for "the reasons which support our adoption of this rule," and
confined himself in Pea to arguing that although this rule departed
from the normal reluctance of appellate courts to impose "upon trial
judges the burden of applying quantitative standards in determining
whether proffered evidence is admissible," there was precedent from
other courts requiring trial judges "to determine voluntariness of a
confession beyond a reasonable doubt as a necessary aspect of determin-
ing admissibility in evidence." 35 The court believed that the stricter
rule was "a sound implementation of the public interest in preventing
involuntary confessions from playing any part in a jury's determination
of guilt. '3
6
Without the aid of the Clifton concurrence we have no explana-
tion of why the public interest requires the court to take extraordinary
measures to prevent involuntary confessions from playing any part in
a jury's determination of guilt. Nor is that conclusion obvious, particu-
larly in view of Judge Burger's opinions for the majority in Clifton
and for the three dissenters in Pea, in which he argued in effect that the
constitutional establishment of the jury system at least creates a pre-
sumption that the jury is capable of assessing the voluntariness of a
confession as well as any other fact, and that experience under the
former rule had not indicated that the jury could not be entrusted
with that role.37 The Clifton concurrence adds the considerations
that the determination of voluntariness "relates to a matter which is
usually the key item in the proof of guilt, and certainly one of over-
powering weight with the jury."3 8 This argument assumes that someone
in the place of a juror could not be expected to follow the instruction
to ignore a confession if he concluded it was involuntary. Perhaps,
given that a legally "involuntary" confession may be a highly proba-
tive one (as apparently was the confession in Pea itself), this conclusion
is correct. Or perhaps the "public interest" that justifies this rule is an
interest in completely discouraging police from attempting to coerce
confessions. But even in Clifton Judge Leventhal did not explain, much
less justify, these assumptions, and certainly the mere allusion to the
"public interest" in Pea does nothing to inform us why Judge Burger,
who obviously saw no such interest, was mistaken.
85 397 F.2d at 638 (footnote omitted).
8 Id. (footnote omitted).
37 371 F.2d at 357-58; 397 F.2d at 638-40.
88 371 F.2d at 362.
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In Weicker v. Weicker, 9 plaintiff, whose husband had obtained
a unilateral Mexican divorce from her and subsequently remarried,
was suing him and his new "wife" for (1) compensatory and punitive
damages for the intentional or reckless infliction of mental suffering,
and (2) injunctive relief restraining both defendants from holding
themselves out as husband and wife and restraining defendant "wife"
from assuming or using defendant husband's name. The New York
Court of Appeals asserted, per curiam, that:
Assuming that New York law now permits "recovery for the inten-
tional infliction of mental distress without proof of the breach of
any duty other than the duty to refrain from inflicting it" ... ,
strong policy considerations militate against judicially applying
these recent developments in this area of the law to the factual con-
text of a dispute arising out of matrimonial differences. To sustain
the claim for damages would result in a revival of evils not unlike
those which prompted the Legislature in 1935 to outlaw actions for
alienation of affections and criminal conversation....40
The court held that these policy reasons, as well as practical limitations
on the ability of equity to enforce such decrees, barred the request
for injunctive relief.
Although the practical limitations alluded to are clear, the "evils"
in question, and hence the "strong policy considerations," are not, nor
are they discussed anywhere else in this one-page opinion, nor is refer-
ence made to where a discussion of them might be found. Perhaps
what was thought evil about the actions outlawed in 1935 was that they
caused people the acute embarrassment of having their most personal
relations discussed in court when this was not justified by the need to
ascertain facts on which a divorce or separation might be granted,
but was merely for the purpose of awarding nominal damages to a
vindictive spouse. The plaintiff here, however, whose husband was
apparently not only living openly with another woman but, by living
with her under color of divorce from plaintiff, was also denying plain-
tiff's status as a wife, may have had a much stronger claim for judicial
relief. On the other hand, the court may have used the phrase "evils
not unlike those which prompted the Legislature" to suggest that there
may be additional, if somewhat different, evils involved in allowing
such an action. They might have believed that if defendants had set
themselves up as husband and wife under color of a divorce (however
illegal), and perhaps had had children, the best policy was to leave
39 22 N.Y.2d 8, 237 N.E.2d 876, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1968).
40 Id. at 11, 237 N.E.2d at 876-77, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 733-34, quoting Halio v. Lurie, 15
App. Div. 2d 62, 66, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759, 763 (2d Dep't 1961).
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them alone and to limit the wife's rights to her claim for support. But
this comes very close to condoning "easy" divorces or even bigamy,
which surely would not correspond to the legislatively established policy
of the state. Perhaps this is why the court contented itself with vague
references to "strong policy considerations."
My criticism of Red Lion, Pea and Weicker does not stem from
disagreement with the results reached. On the contrary, agreeing with
these results and convinced that justifications for them can be found in
the needs of American society as they are generally perceived today, I
was struck by the paucity of reasoning that the opinions brought to
bear on their behalf. Perhaps the explanation is that the court in each
instance was faced with a situation in which a thorough examination
of the relevant authorities would have revealed a substantial body of
legal doctrine that seemed to go in the other direction-in Red Lion,
the first amendment, in Pea, the notion that in a jury trial the judge
should have no occasion to apply a "reasonable doubt" standard, and in
Weicker, the divorce and bigamy laws. Lacking the resources to con-
front those doctrines squarely and demonstrate why they were not con-
trolling in the case at hand, the courts slighted both the doctrines and
the reasons for distinguishing them by settling for conclusory state-
ments that the "public interest" or "strong policy considerations"
dictated the results.
B. Social Policy Derived
Hardy v. United States41 involved a collateral attack, under a fed-
eral statute, on a narcotics conviction that had been affirmed on ap-
peal,42 but prior to another decision of the court setting standards
for what constitutes an unreasonable delay in making an arrest.43
These standards, if applied to Hardy and his fellow appellant, might
arguably have required that they be granted a new trial. Judge Tamm
wrote an opinion which, citing many cases, held "that issues disposed
of on appeal from the original judgment of conviction will not be re-
viewed again under [the federal provision]." 44 Then, responding to
Chief Judge Bazelon's dissent on this point (which was concurred in by
Judge Fahy), Judge Tamm briefly discussed the case on the merits and
41 381 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In Hardy, relief was sought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1964).
42 Hardy v. United States, 343 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984
(1966).
43 Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In Ross, the court explicitly
distinguished Hardy. Id. at 215.
44 381 F.2d at 943.
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concluded that "the jury's on-the-scene evaluation of the credibility
of the police officer and the informer 45 should be determinative.
Finally, perhaps in an effort to persuade Judge Fahy to concur in the
result-affirming the denial of relief-despite his disagreement on
the merits, Judge Tamm argued:
Were this panel to ignore all judicial precedent and overrule not
one but two prior panels of the court, it would, in effect, be by ju-
dicial fiat extending the ever-lengthening processes which constitute
Perpetual Appeals. It is popular now to publicly decry the huge
backlog of criminal cases awaiting trial in our District Court, and
yet the procedure proposed in the dissenting opinion would add to
the burden of our trial court the necessity for conducting further
hearings in this case and, I suppose, similar cases .... It does not
require the services of efficiency experts, management surveys, or
administrative studies to discover that in a case such as this a court
is figuratively spinning its wheels by making no forward progress in
dealing with the Judiciary's serious problems of congestion.46
This response to public demand for speedier criminal justice
was used to justify a refusal to give an expansive interpretation to "this
court's basic responsibility.., from time to time to remand individual
cases to the District Court for further proceedings." 47 It was made in
the face of an eloquent argument by the Chief Judge, concurred in by
the remaining judge, that an injustice might possibly have been done
to appellants which could be corrected by a new trial.48 Whatever the
merits of the balance reached in this particular case, the social policy
argument made is the appropriate one to juxtapose against the argu-
ment implicit in the dissent that any possibility of injustice during a
trial, however remote,49 is sufficient reason to upset a conviction.
In Wise v. United States,5" the District of Columbia Circuit
held that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), which prohibits
unnecessary delay in presenting the accused to a magistrate, "does not
prohibit delay for a reasonable time after arrest in order to provide
identification of the suspect. And this principle already established in
this circuit for sight identification, also applies to voice identifica-
tions."' 1 To justify this extension (or application) of the principle,
Judge Leventhal argued that one of the "legitimate police concerns"
45 Id. at 944.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 951.
49 The dissent conceded that "Hardy's story seems incredible." Id. at 949.
50 383 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 964 (1968).
51 Id. at 208 (footnote omitted).
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was to "provide additional and reliable proof against the suspect."5' 2
The court stated:
It is not without relevance that the Supreme Court has recently
held-in another context, but involving rights of privacy that stand
on high constitutional ground-that the rights of a suspect are sub-
ject to limitations arising out of society's interest in police activity
(searches) undertaken to "aid in the identification of the culprit"
and to obtain evidence "which would aid in apprehending and con-
victing criminals." 53
The court concluded that "we do not consider a prompt identification
of a suspect... to diverge from the rudiments of fair play that govern
the due balance of pertinent interests that suspects be treated fairly
while the state pursues its responsibility of apprehending criminals."54
Although this case might have been decided by the precedential
method since the court argued that there was no material difference
between sight and voice identification, Judge Leventhal thought that
society's interest in this kind of police activity needed to be stated, and
that citation of the Supreme Court's recognition of this interest in
another context would lend support to the statement, particularly
in light of the impression (not only among laymen) that recent
Supreme Court decisions have tended to deny the importance of that
interest. The question is close and the analytical distinction unsure,
but the context suggests that the Supreme Court was cited not as a
statement of law in a related area with which this decision could prop-
erly be harmonized, but rather as an indication of a national consensus
as to what constitutes "legitimate police concerns."
By contrast, Edwards v. Habib55 is a paradigm of the use of the
social policy derived method. Habib had given his month-to-month
tenant, Mrs. Edwards, a thirty-day statutory notice to vacate and had
brought an action to recover possession sometime after the District
of Columbia's Department of Licenses and Inspections had ordered
him to correct the more than forty sanitary code violations it had dis-
covered during an inspection instituted upon Mrs. Edwards's complaint.
Mrs. Edwards contested the eviction on the ground that it was under-
taken from retaliatory motives and hence was improper. The only
authorities directly in point were two statutory schemes. In one, urged
by Habib, Congress established the traditional property remedies
for summary eviction of tenants from month to month, the only stated
52 id. at 209 (footnote omitted).
53 Id. at 209 n.7, quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1967).
54 Id. at 210.
55 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 US. 1016 (1969).
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requirement of which was that the landlord give the tenant thirty
days' notice, which Habib had done. 6 In the other, urged by Mrs.
Edwards, Congress authorized and directed the Commissioners of the
District of Columbia "to make and enforce such building regulations
for the said District as they deem advisable," where "[s]uch rules and
regulations ... have the same force and effect within the District of
Columbia as if enacted by Congress." 57 Extensive housing regulations
had been promulgated by the District Commissioners pursuant to this
grant of authority.
Judge Wright began his opinion by developing at length the
argument that the courts, and perhaps Habib himself, are prevented
from taking action to evict Mrs. Edwards because of her constitutional
rights to petition the government and to report violations of law. But
in the third part of his opinion, the only part for which he obtained
the necessary concurrence of Judge McGowan, Judge Wright an-
nounced that he would and could refrain from deciding the merits
of the constitutional arguments he had developed since, "[a]s a matter
of statutory construction and for reasons of public policy, such an
eviction cannot be permitted."58 His justification for this conclusion
contains so many illustrations of how social policy can be utilized
in judicial decision-making that it is worth quoting at length:
The housing and sanitary codes, especially in light of Congress'
explicit direction for their enactment, indicate a strong and perva-
sive congressional concern to secure for the city's slum dwellers de-
cent, or at least safe and sanitary, places to live. Effective implemen-
tation and enforcement of the codes obviously depend in part on
private initiative in the reporting of violations. Though there is no
official procedure for the filing of such complaints, the bureaucratic
structure of the Department of Licenses and Inspections establishes
such a procedure, and for fiscal year 1966 nearly a third of the cases
handled by the Department arose from private complaints. To per-
mit retaliatory evictions, then, would dearly frustrate the effective-
ness of the housing code as a means of upgrading the quality of
housing in Washington.
As judges, "we cannot shut our eyes to matters of public noto-
riety and general cognizance. When we take our seats on the bench
we are not struck with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges
what we see as men."... In trying to effect the will of Congress and
as a court of equity we have the responsibility to consider the social
context in which our decisions will have operational effect. In light
of the appalling condition and shortage of housing in Washington,
Go D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-902, 45-910 (1967).
57 Id. § 1-228.
68 397 F.2d at 699 (footnote omitted). ".-
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the expense of moving, the inequality of bargaining power between
tenant and landlord, and the social and economic importance of
assuring at least minimum standards in housing conditions, we do
not hesitate to declare that retaliatory eviction cannot be tolerated.
There can be no doubt that the slum dweller, even though his
home be marred by housing code violations, will pause long before
he complains of them if he fears eviction as a consequence. 59
Confronted by "controlling" statutory authority but a clear ab-
sence of conscious congressional intent on the issue, the court did not
pretend to the contrary, but clearly confronted the necessity of "recon-
ciling and harmonizing two federal statutes so as to best effectuate the
purposes of each." 60 It stated:
When Congress enacted 45 D.C. CODE §§ 902 and 910, it did not
have in mind their possible use in effectuating retaliatory evictions.
Indeed, when they were enacted there was no housing code at all.
And in all probability Congress did not attend to the problem of
retaliatory evictions when it directed the enactment of the housing
code. Our task is to determine what Congress would have done, in
light of the purpose and language of the statute, had it confronted
the question now before the court. 61
To answer that question, the social problems to which the housing
code was a response had to be examined, and the social policies con-
sistent with the spirit of the congressional directive to the District
Commissioners to develop a housing code had to be discovered. As
to the social problems Judge Wright quoted the 1956 statement of pur-
pose in the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia, 2 which
described existing and impending conditions of overcrowding, dilap-
idation, and inadequate facilities prevalent in housing in various areas
of the District. As evidence that these conditions still existed-and
hence that the interpretation of the statutes in question was accurate-
he quoted almost identical findings a decade later from a report on
housing conditions in the District: "'[M]ore than 100,000 children are
growing up in Washington now under one or more housing conditions
which create psychological, social, and medical impairments, and make
satisfactory home life difficult or a practical impossibility.' "63 Supreme
Court descriptions of the effects of substandard housing are quoted:
59 Id. at 700-01 (footnotes omitted), quoting Ho Ah Kow v. Hunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255
(No. 6546) (C.C.D. Cal. 1879).
60 Id. at 702 (footnote omitted).
61 Id. at 702 n.50.
62 Id. at 700 n.40.
63 Id. at 701 n.47, quoting REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CAPrrAL PLANNING COMMISSION:
PROBLEMS OF HOUSING PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 5-6 (1966).
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"Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more
than spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suf-
focate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status
of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insufferable bur-
den. They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community
which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men
turn. The misery of housing may despoil a community as an open
sewer may ruin a river." ... "The need to maintain basic, minimal
standards of housing, to prevent the spread of disease and of that
pervasive breakdown in the fiber of a people which is produced by
slums and the absence of the barest essentials of civilized living, has
mounted to a major concern of American government." 64
The last quotation, and to a lesser extent the previous two, contain
implicit statements of social policy-i.e., that we must do something
reasonably calculated to alleviate these problems. Judge Wright
pointed to more explicit indications of social policy in statutory pro-
visions for enforcing housing codes and standards in federally financed
housing units, and law review articles discussing possible ways for
making housing codes more effective. Finally, to demonstrate the prac-
tical importance of a private complaints procedure to the enforcement
of housing codes, he cited the finding of a subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the District of Columbia that" '[o]f 47,701 cases handled,
almost 15,000 were initiated by private complaint.' "65 Thus, to sup-
port his understanding of the social policy considerations relevant to
the proper interpretation of the applicable statutes, Judge Wright re-
ferred to at least eight sources of information apart from the statutes
involved, their legislative history, and their subsequent interpreta-
tion. These included: (1) other legislation addressed to similar prob-
lems; (2) the District Commissioners' statement of purpose for
developing a housing code; (3) relevant dicta of the Supreme Court;
(4) a report by the National Capital Planning Commission on the
problems of housing; (5) administrative procedures established by the
Department of Licenses and Inspections; (6) published statistics demon-
strating the importance of these procedures; (7) law review articles; and
(8) matters of public notoriety.
In Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,6" the New York Court of
Appeals had to decide whether the content and form of plaintiff's
decedent's contract with an air carrier was such as to invoke the
64 Id., quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954), and Frank v. Maryland,
359 U.S. 360, 371 (1959).
65 Id. at 700 n.43.




Warsaw Convention's drastic limitation on the liability of air carriers
for the wrongful death of passengers engaged in "international trans-
portation";6 7 as of 1959, when the accident occurred, this limit was
below $10,000. Chief Judge Fuld first discussed whether the leg of the
international trip in which the fatal crash occurred should be con-
sidered "international transportation" when that leg was entirely do-
mestic and was not on a carrier named in the passenger's original ticket;
the terms of the contract and the Convention dearly indicated that it
should be so considered, and the court decided accordingly. The much
more difficult question hinged on the requirement of Article 3 of the
Convention that an airline passenger ticket contain a "statement
that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability estab-
lished by this convention."168 The court began by pointing out that
"[t]he ticket before us did contain, in footnotes on the several coupons,
such a statement.., but, as is apparent from inspection, it is in such
exceedingly small and fine print as almost to defy reading." 6 There-
fore the question was whether this "statement" should be held to
satisfy Article 3. Judge Fuld noted that
the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1963 adopted a regulation requiring
(1) that the statement as to limitation of liability follow the far
more clear and specific language specified by the board; (2) that it
"be printed in type at least as large as ten point modern type [as
contrasted with the 4Y point type in this case] and in ink contrast-
ing with the stock"; and (3) that a similar statement be placed at all
ticket counters in letters at least one fourth of an inch high .... 70
He then referred to inaction by the Senate and action by the State
Department which tended to support the notification policy.
The language of the statement which was mandated by the
CAB was similar to that provided for in the amendment to article 3
appearing in the so-called Hague Protocol to the Convention exe-
cuted in 1955.... This protocol was never ratified by the Senate,
apparently because its most significant feature, increasing the maxi-
mum liability to $16,000, was considered inadequate. It is of more
than passing interest that in 1965 our Government in a Notice of
Denunciation declared that it opposed the Convention's low limits
on liability and indicated an intention to withdraw from the Con-
67 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 22, para. 1, 49 Stat. 8019 (1936), T.S. No. 876 (effective
Oct. 29, 1934).
68 Id. art. 3, para. l(e), 49 Stat. 3015.
69 21 N.Y.2d at 168-69, 234 N.E.2d at 202-03, 287 N.YS.2d at 19 (footnote omitted).
70 Id. at 171, 234 N.E.2d at 204, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 21 [footnote omitted], quoting 14
C.F.R. § 221.175 (1971).
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vention unless an agreement were reached (among the world's inter-
national air carriers) to raise the limit to $75,000 and that in May
of 1966 such an agreement was executed.7'
Judge Fuld concluded that:
These decisions and regulations are suggestive of a national
policy requiring that air carriers give passengers clear and conspicu-
ous notice before they will be permitted to limit their liability for
injuries caused by their negligence.... [T]he carrier's failure to
give the requisite notice prevents it from asserting a limitation of
liability.72
Thus, the New York Court of Appeals, without dissent, interpreted
a 1929 treaty on the basis of current social policies to require, despite
almost fifty years of uncontested practice to the contrary, that airlines
provide not only a "statement" of the limitation of liability, but a
"clear and conspicuous notice." This use of social policy in treaty
interpretation is a highly avant-garde technique-a Second Circuit
case that decided the same issue the same way for substantially the
same reasons caused the Supreme Court to split four-to-four on review
only three months after Egan."
Simpson v. Loehmann74 is not so much a case of "social policy
derived" as of "suggested social policy considered and rejected." How-
ever, just as a case that examined and rejected the claim that a par-
ticular statute had overruled otherwise applicable prior precedents
would be classified under the statutory rather than precedential method,
so Simpson, in which the New York Court of Appeals refused to over-
rule a year-old precedent either on social policy or constitutional
grounds, is properly seen as an example of the social policy derived
method. The precedent involved in Simpson was Seider v. Roth,75
which held for the first time (in any state) that the victim of an auto-
mobile accident could sue the party allegedly responsible in a New
York court, without obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
if the defendant's insurance carrier does business in the state. Juris-
diction in Seider was based on the New York "situs" of the insurance
carrier's "debt" to defend the insured to the limits of the policy; this
"debt," if attached, serves as a res whose possession is then disputed
71 Id. at 171 n.6, 234 N.E.2d at 204 n.6, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 21 n.6.
72 Id. at 171-72, 234 N.E.2d at 204, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22.
73 Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1967), affd by an equally
divided Court, 390 US. 455 (1968).
74 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
75 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
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between the plaintiff and the defendant (or more realistically, the
defendant's insurer).
The Seider court, speaking through then Chief Judge Desmond,
had treated the problem primarily as one of construing the New York
statutes that permit attachment of a debt. In Simpson, Chief Judge
Fuld first discussed the constitutional due process question, concluding
on the basis of precedent that
we perceive no denial of due process since the presence of that debt
in this State... -contingent or inchoate though it may be-rep-
resents sufficient of a property right in the defendant to furnish the
nexus with, and the interest in, New York to empower its courts to
exercise an in rem jurisdiction over him.
76
The only indication up to this point that the case could not be decided
on the basis of the meaning of "debt," as that meaning had been
elaborated in earlier decisions, is Judge Desmond's statement, quoted
by Judge Fuld, that "'there is no policy reason against requiring the
insurer to come in to New York and defend as to an accident which
occurred [outside the state] injuring New York residents . . . .' "7
This statement ignores at least one obvious reason. Since in most of
these actions the defendant will be a resident of the state in which
the accident occurred, such actions would ordinarily be brought in
that state, the forum most convenient to witnesses, whereas granting
Seider-type jurisdiction may mean that in many actions testimony
essential to establishing what occurred may be available in deposition
form only. But Judge Fuld, doubtless acutely aware of the storm of
criticism aroused by Seider,78 added:
[I]t may prove helpful to have in mind some of the considerations
upon which that decision was predicated.
The historical limitations on both in personam and in rem ju-
risdiction, with their rigid tests, are giving way to a more realistic
and reasonable evaluation of the respective rights of plaintiffs, de-
fendants and the State in terms of fairness. ... Such an evaluation
requires a practical appraisal of the situation of the various parties
rather than an emphasis upon somewhat magical and medieval con-
cepts of presence and power. Viewed realistically, the insurer in a
case such as the present is in full control of the litigation; it selects
the defendant's attorneys; it decides if and when to settle; and it
76 21 N.Y.2d at 310, 234 N.E2.d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
77 Id., quoting Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 114-15, 216 N.E.2d 312, 314-15, 269
N.Y.S.2d 99, 102 (1966).
78 Some of which is cited in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 119 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969), where Judge Friendly, on behalf of a divided panel, held
that the Seider rule did not violate due process rights.
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makes all procedural decisions in connection with the litigation.
*.. Moreover, where the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state
and the insurer is present in and regulated by it, the State has a
substantial and continuing relation with the controversy. For juris-
dictional purposes, in assessing fairness under the due process clause
and in determining the public policy of New York, such factors
loom large.79
This passage demonstrates Judge Fuld's understanding that in
deciding this case, whether on statutory, constitutional, or "public
policy" grounds, the crucial issues to be resolved were questions not
of linguistic usage but of social reality-how cases are actually handled,
and who has which powers and which responsibilities. But the passage
itself is an example of social policy asserted rather than derived, since
although it points first to the freedom of the court to devise a policy,
then to some of the facts that a court devising such policy should take
into account, it concludes not with an indication of the values to be
served or the social goals to be achieved by adopting one policy over
another, but merely with facts further supporting the conclusion that
it is free to devise the policy that it asserted. The failure of the passage
to qualify as social policy derived is of more than formal significance;
it indicates that judge Fuld failed to state the social purpose, the
rationale, underlying the revolutionary Seider decision and the decision
to follow it. The social purpose involved would seem to be that com-
pensation in automobile cases should be facilitated and not impeded
by jurisdictional rules. If this was the court's purpose, it is understand-
able that it did not state it plainly in either opinion.
Although Judge Fuld was deliberately vague in specifying the
public policy adopted in Seider, he was precise in rejecting alternative
policies.
The position taken by some who disagree with Seider would
require that, as a matter of State policy, insurance be explicitly
eliminated as the basis for the exercise of our in rem jurisdiction
but this represents a judgment requiring data and information with
respect to the practical effect of the Seider decision not presently
available to this court.
Almost half a century ago, Chief Judge CARnozo [wrote] ...
that "The courts are not helped as they could and ought to be in
the adaptation of law to justice". Some time thereafter, the New
York Legislature created a Law Revision Commission and, more re-
cently, the State's Judicial Conference appointed an Advisory Com-
mission on Practice and Procedure to make studies and recommend
changes in the rules and statutes governing our law. Revision of the
79 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 NY.S.2d at 637.
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bases for in personam jurisdiction has been the subject of recent
major legislative changes. The bases for the exercise of in rem ju-
risdiction, however, have been carried over into the CPLR from the
Civil Practice Act with little change. Under the circumstances, it
would be both useful and desirable for the Law Revision Commis-
sion and the Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference,
jointly or separately, to conduct studies in depth and make recom-
mendations with respect to the impact of in rem jurisdiction on not
only litigants in personal injury cases and the insurance industry
but also our citizenry generally. In the course of such studies, con-
sideration will undoubtedly be given to the relationship inter se, of
in rem jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction and forum non con-
veniens. Absent new data suggesting the desirability of a departure
from the general principles underlying in rem jurisdiction, as re-
flected in Seider, we find neither basis nor jurisdiction for departing
from our holding in that case.80
Judge Fuld made two points here: first, that it was too early for any-
one to know the practical effect of the Seider decision, and second,
that the court, with its case-by-case approach and its limited research
staff, was not in a position to consider a whole area of the law in depth
and to make empirical studies of the impact of the law on out-of-court
conduct. The first point is well taken if we concede that Seider is worth
a try; the only problem is that the court did not indicate what it was
trying to do or what might be counted as success. The second point
follows logically from the first, again taking Seider as given. And per-
haps the court, having fended off a constitutional challenge to Seider
in the first part of the Simpson opinion, would have been justified in
giving it the stare decisis presumption of correctness in the second. It
is dear, however, that Judge Fuld was not relying on that presumption.
His reference to "the general principles underlying in rem jurisdiction,
as reflected in Seider" indicates that he was urging the correctness of
Seider on the (incorrect) ground that it merely reflected generally ac-
cepted principles. If Seider was still at issue, and if we accept what the
court pretended to deny but no one else even questions-that Seider
was a departure in the law-then the second point of this passage, that
the court was incapable of making a reasonably based departure in this
area of the law, is a very strong argument against Seider. But if the
real rationale of Seider was to increase the likelihood of people injured
in automobile accidents recovering their damages, then it would not
take the services of the Law Revision Commission to conclude with
certainty that the rule in Seider would contribute to this. Of course,
80 Id. at 311-12, 234 N.EY.2d at 672-73, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 638-39, quoting Cardozo, A Min.
istry of Justice, 35 HIv. L. REv. 113 (1921).
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if the Law Revision Commission came up with well-documented find-
ings that Seider was being used primarily by people with false or un-
usually inflated claims to obtain windfalls from insurance companies,
the court might be inclined to reconsider.
Udell v. Haass involved the validity of a village ordinance amend-
ing its zoning map in such a way as to prevent plaintiff from building
a proposed bowling alley and supermarket or discount house. The New
York Court of Appeals held the rezoning invalid as discriminatory and
not in accordance with the village's "comprehensive plan." Although
the mandate that zoning be "in accordance with a comprehensive
plan" is contained in New York's enabling statute,82 Judge Keating
approached the problem of determining the meaning and effect that
should be given that phrase by closely examining the continuing policies
that support and mold the institution of zoning rather than the
relevant legislative history or the cases applying the standard.
lffnderlying the entire concept of zoning is the assumption that zon-
ing can be a vital tool for maintaining a civilized form of existence
only if we apply the insights and the learning of the philosopher,
the city planner, the economist, the sociologist, the public health
expert and all the other professions concerned with urban prob-
lems.
This fundamental conception of zoning has been present from
its inception. The almost universal statutory requirement that zon-
ing conform to a "well-considered plan" or "comprehensive plan"
is a reflection of that view.... The thought behind the requirement
is that consideration must be given to the needs of the community
as a whole. In exercising their zoning powers, the local authorities
must act for the benefit of the community as a whole following a
calm and deliberate consideration of the alternatives, and not be-
cause of the whims of either an articulate minority or even majority
of the community.... Thus, the mandate of the Village Law (§177)
is not a mere technicality which serves only as an obstacle course for
public officials to overcome in carrying out their duties. Rather, the
comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning.88
Judge Keating next quoted Professor Haar's argument for placing
increased weight on this requirement in the judicial review of zoning
regulations.
'With the heavy presumption of constitutional validity that at-
taches to legislation purportedly under the police power, and the
difficulty in judicially applying a 'reasonableness' standard, there is
81 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968).
82 N.Y. VrLLAGE LAW § 177 (McKinney 1966).
83 21 N.Y.2d at 469, 235 N.E.2d at 900, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
1971]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
danger that zoning, considered as a self-contained activity rather
than as a means to a broader end, may tyrannize individual prop-
erty owners. Exercise of the legislative power to zone should be gov-
erned by rules and standards as clearly defined as possible, so that it
cannot be operated in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion, and
will actually be directed to the health, safety, welfare and morals of
the community."84
He concluded that to assure zoning did not "degenerate into a talis-
manic word ... to excuse all sorts of arbitrary infringements on the
property rights of the landowner. .... [O]ur courts must require local
zoning authorities to pay more than mock obeisance to the statutory
mandate that zoning be 'in accordance with a comprehensive plan'."8 5
The court proceeded to do just that, holding that the ordinance
not only did not conform to the village's general "developmental
policy", but... was also inconsistent with what had been the fun-
damental rationale of the village's zoning law and map. The
amendment was not the result of a deliberate change in community
policy and was enacted without sufficient forethought or planning.88
Judge Keating quoted Professor Haar's finding that the courts
were substituting such verbal formulae as "broad geographical cover-
age, 'policy' of the planning or zoning commission, the zoning ordi-
nance itself, the rational basis underlying the ordinance"87 for the
plain meaning of the statutory phrase. In this case instead of attempt-
ing to devise its own formula, which like those cited by Haar would
have reduced the phrase "in accordance with a comprehensive plan"
to requiring merely that "zoning be 'reasonable,' and impartial in
treatment,"88 the court searched for the basic social policies affecting
zoning. It thus became aware of the potentiality of the phrase as a
standard for judicial review permitting communities to obtain the
full legitimate benefits of zoning while protecting individuals from the
abuse of majority power.
Dobkin v. Chapman8 9 was a consolidated appeal of three cases
arising from New York automobile accidents. Plaintiff in each case,
not being able to locate the defendant allegedly responsible for his
injuries, received permission from a trial court to serve the defendant
84 Id. at 469-70, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894, quoting Haar, In Accordance
with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARv. L. Ray. 1154, 1157-58 (1955).
85 Id. at 470, 235 NXE.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
86 Id. at 475, 235 N.E.2d at 904, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
87 Id. at 471, 235 N.E.2d at 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 895, quoting Haar, supra note 84, at
1173.
88 Id.
89 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.YS.2d 161 (1968).
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at his last known address by ordinary mail, even though it was likely
that the defendant would not thereby receive actual notice of the
action against him. In two cases the appellant was the Motor Vehicle
Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC), a state agency de-
signed to provide the innocent victim of an uninsured motorist with
a source of recovery; in the third the defendant's insurer sought rever-
sal. Chief Judge Fuld first discussed whether this manner of service
was authorized by the New York statute, 90 and concluded on the basis
of "the language of the statute, its context and its history" 91 that it
was. Reaching then the constitutional question of whether this method
of service afforded the defendants sufficient notice and opportunity
to be heard, he observed once again that due process "has come to
represent a realistic and reasonable evaluation of the respective in-
terests of plaintiffs, defendants and the state under the circumstances
of the particular case," 92 citing for this proposition the same cases that
he had cited in Simpson. However, in Dobkin, unlike Simpson, Judge
Fuld was able to support his solicitude for the plaintiffs' interests.
[T]he State's interest and concern has been evidenced by its policy
of ameliorating the difficulties that often beset motor vehicle acci-
dent victims in collecting damages for their injuries. Examples of
this policy are the requirements for a showing of financial respon-
sibility as a condition to obtaining registration of a motor vehicle
... ; the creation of the MVAIC... to provide a source of recovery
for victims of uninsured or unknown motorists... ; and the [lib-
eral] provisions for service of process found in the Vehicle and Traf-
fic Law .... 93
Although these statutes did not provide direct authority for the action
taken in Dobkin, they were offered as evidence of a strong state policy
of protecting injured parties against the irresponsible motorist. The
latter could have assured himself of notice
by complying with the requirements of his State's licensing author-
ities that he keep them informed of his changes of address... ; he
can keep in touch with his insurance carrier; and he can keep in
touch with the victim of the accident until he is reasonably assured
that no claim will be asserted against him.
... Indeed, in an automobile case, no defendant need be with-
out notice unless he chooses and wants to be; many an injured
plaintiff, however, will go without recompense if, in a proper case,
the standards of informative notice may not be relaxed.04
9o Presently N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 508(5) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
91 21 N.Y.2d at 500, 236 N.E.2d at 456, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
92 Id. at 502, 236 N.E.2d at 458, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
93 Id. at 503-04, 236 N.E.2d at 459, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
94 Id. at 504, 236 N.E.2d at 459, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 172-73.
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Here, unlike Simpson, the court knew before the case went to
trial that the defendant had done something irresponsible-disap-
peared without a trace after being involved in a serious accident. Nor
did any other state have a significant interest in protecting the defen-
dants. Thus, Judge Fuld could openly champion the interests of the
plaintiffs on grounds of public policy.
Finally, in Toth v. Community Hospital,95 plaintiffs were twins
who had been born prematurely. While at the hospital they were given
oxygen for more than thirty days, and they were blinded as a result.
In 1953, when they were born, some doctors still believed (erroneously,
it became clear shortly thereafter) that the mortality rate of premature
babies could be reduced by administering oxygen to them; however,
the dangers of blindness from excessive use of oxygen may have been
generally known at the time the twins were born. In any event, the
pediatrician prescribed oxygen at the rate of six liters per minute for
the first twelve hours, and thereafter at the rate of four liters per
minute. There was evidence in the case that the oxygen had been
administered at the six liter rate for the entire period, as well as evi-
dence that if the doctor's orders had been followed the blindness might
have been prevented or reduced.
Judge Keating first discussed the trial court's failure to charge
the jury that if they found that the hospital's nursing staff had deviated
from the doctor's orders, that the doctor should have discovered this,
and that he should have known that this deviation would unnecessarily
increase the likelihood of the children's blindness, then they could
find the doctor guilty of negligence. He concluded that the jury should
have been so charged. He then considered the propriety of the trial
court's dismissal of the complaint against the hospital.
The primary duty of a hospital's nursing staff is to follow the
physician's orders, and a hospital is normally protected from tort
liability if its staff follows the orders. Nevertheless, if the doctor's
orders are to be a hospital's shield from tort liability, it cannot at
the same time maintain that a deviation which causes injury cannot
be a basis for tort liability because other physicians or medical in-
stitutions might consider the treatment actually given as acceptable.
More important than the question of logical consistency is the issue
of social policy. There is every reason to encourage the hospital
staff to carry out diligently the doctor's orders while there are no
countervailing considerations which would justify relieving the hos-
pital from tort liability for failing to do so.90
95 22 N.Y.2d 255, 259 N.E2d 368, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1968).
96 Id. at 265, 239 N.E.2d at 374, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 449-50 (footnote omitted).
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It should be apparent that this is a very simple and non-contro-
versial use of social policy and that the social policy in question-that
of not permitting nurses to overrule (or, more likely, neglect) doctors'
orders-is so generally acceptable that it would be superfluous to cite
authority for it. The result should not obscure the possibility that
the policy could have been ignored in the face of an argument that
the hospital should not be liable if there was substantial support in the
medical profession for what the nurses actually did. This is a marginal
case, however, since several of the Grand Style cases may have made
this much use of social policy without venturing, or troubling, to label
it as such.
CONCLUSION
We are now in a position to begin to answer the questions of the
lawyer, the judge, and the social critic as to the extent and manner
of the use of social policy in judicial decision-making.
The lawyer was interested to know the likelihood that cases will
be decided on the basis of social policy, whether there is any way to
predict the cases that will be decided on this basis, and the social
policies that will be considered. Table 1 indicates that, depending on
the court in question, the likelihood could range from zero to five or
six percent. The cases in the sample that were decided on the basis of
social policy were in six areas: personal injury (four, two of which were
in a jurisdictional context), criminal procedure (three), communica-
tions (one), housing (one), zoning (one), and family (one); such areas
are therefore amenable to this type of decision-making. But examina-
tion of the cases indicates that the applicability of the social policy
method is not restricted to these areas. Of course there had to "be"
a social policy in the area for the application of this method to make
sense. But all that is required for a social policy to "be" is that the
law not be settled as to some question and that the needs of society,
as they are perceived by the judge and some other influential members
of society, indicate a preference for one resolution over another. These
requirements are met, to a greater or lesser extent, in nearly every
case worth appealing, as well as in the great majority of cases included
in this sample.
Where social policies are used, however, Table 2 indicates that
it is twice as likely that such policies will favor those categories of people
who are relatively powerless (seven cases) than that they will be neutral
in this respect (three cases), and about seven times more likely that the
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policies will favor the relatively powerless than that they will favor the
relatively powerful. The former point is particularly significant since
it is three times as likely that decisions that do not use social policy
will be neutral (207 cases) than that they will favor the relatively
powerless (sixty-six cases). This does not mean, however, that a lawyer
would be wasting his time urging social policies that support the
status quo; the efficacy of such arguments in convincing a court to
adhere to precedent may be considerable. Since, however, a court de-
ciding for reasons of social policy to reach a result that can be sup-
ported by more orthodox methods is likely to write an opinion
reflecting those methods, the results of arguing social policy on behalf
of the status quo will only rarely be detected by the method used in
this study. Similarly, the four percent rate for the use of the social
policy technique (Table 1) may significantly understate the efficacy
of social policy arguments on behalf of change, since a judge who
does not like to decide cases on the basis of social policy may yet be
sufficiently impressed by social policy arguments to look hard and long
for some more traditional basis on which to rest a decision consistent
with these arguments. Thus, the significantly higher-than-average net
(and gross) liberalness of the Grand Style (Table 2) may well reflect
the influence of social policy arguments on highly craft-conscious
judges.
As to the lawyer's fear that the sporadic acceptance by courts
of social policy arguments will make planning and counseling on the
basis of established doctrine particularly treacherous, it is significant
that in none of the social policy cases sampled was social policy the
sole method used to reach the result; rather, in each case the court
took care to attack the foundations of the arguments for the contrary
result, to distinguish any adverse precedents, and frequently to cite
some legal authorities as advocating the result to be reached, before
discussing the social policy considerations that supported its decision.
Even in the two cases overruling established usage of precedent, Pea
and Egan, the court stated that earlier decisions had foreshadowed its
result. Thus, the careful lawyer always had some warning, based on the
vulnerability of his arguments "on the law," that resort by the court to
social policy considerations was a significant possibility.
We are now also in a position to reassure the judge who is worried
that social policies, apart from those embodied in "legal" authorities
traditionally considered binding, have now become a source of law
that he must consider in making his judicial decisions. Whether or
not he takes such policies into account in reaching decisions, it is up
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to his discretion whether to discuss them in his opinions. As we see
from Table 4, the eleven majority opinions that drew on social policy
were decided by only five judges, four of whom decided more than
one of the cases sampled (Judge Wright is the exception). The other
nineteen judges never drew extensively upon social policy, and those
who drew on it to the extent that Judge Keating did in Toth did not
trouble to label it as such. It is likely, however, that the seventeen to
twenty percent rate of use of the flexible and eclectic Grand Style by
the three courts, and the high net liberalness of the results of its use,
indicate that their receptiveness and responsiveness to social policy
arguments (whether or not referred to as such) is considerably greater
than would be suggested by the four percent average use of the social
policy methods in their opinions.
The social critic, interested in the extent to which the courts are
responsive to demands for social change on behalf of those whose in-
terests are not completely served by the existing formal law (preceden-
tial or statutory), should probably be more concerned about the liberal-
ness of the results reached-a direct measure of this responsiveness
-than about the methods used to reach (or justify) those results. Table
2 indicates that twenty-four percent (seventy-three of 300) of the cases
decided reached a "liberal" result, whereas only six percent (seventeen
of 300) reached a "conservative" result. Since many of the "neutral"
cases did not involve issues in which a liberal or conservative result
was possible, this is impressive evidence that courts are responding,
consciously or otherwise, to a social policy favoring an equalization
of power among all members of society. That sixty-four percent (seven
of eleven) of the cases using the social policy methods reached a liberal
result, and that ten percent (seven of seventy-three) of the liberal cases,
as opposed to four percent (eleven of 300) of all cases, used the social
policy methods, only makes the obvious point that in an era when the
dominant theme of social policy is a liberal one, the explicit use of
social policy in judicial decision-making is highly correlated with liber-
alness of results.
If we were to adopt arguendo the liberal position as that has been
defined herein, would any social policy be suggested as to the proper
use of social policy in judicial decision-making? Obviously, a judge
who does not at any level of consciousness measure the claims of a
liberal social policy against those of the more conservative established
legal authorities will by default decide the case in accordance with the
latter. Thus, the lawyer whose case is "weak on the law" should pre-
sent the relevant social policy in the fullest, best-documented argument
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possible; but the rareness of acknowledged use of social policy by the
courts suggests that such arguments may be most acceptable if they
can be given in the form of reasons for following or elaborating upon
some existing authority.
Further, although the findings here do not indicate the direction
of causality between explicit use of social policy and liberalness of re-
sults reached, it is reasonable to assume that a canon of judicial opin-
ion writing requiring judges to set forth the relevant social policy
considerations in all cases in which they conceivably exist, whether the
direction indicated by these considerations is taken or not, would en-
courage judges who would be willing to base their decisions (actual
and written) on social policy to do so. The prevalence of the Grand
Style indicates that the canons of judicial craftsmanship no longer re-
quire that the appearance of mechanically measuring the case against
the applicable authorities be maintained; there is no reason, then, for
the courts to stop at the Grand Style stage, in which they admit to
extrapolating from landmarks but still deny that they are doing so
for the purpose of getting somewhere. As the analysis of the social
policy derived cases in the sample demonstrates, the use of this method
does not permit the judge to follow his own prejudices without having
to consider the desires of the people in whose name he ultimately
speaks. To the contrary, this method requires that a judge tie his value-
commitments to the needs of society and expose this alleged tie to
public scrutiny.
